


SECTION 5

How valid is the view that colonial nationalism was the key to decolonisation?

Nationalism undoubtedly contributed to independence, but its impact was variable across the British Empire. At times it was the direct causal link of independence, while on other occasions it was a factor amongst many others. There was no concept of nationalism that permeated the empire. Often, nationalist groups were in conflict with rival nationalist groups. Perhaps the one common thread that did run through nationalist movements was the determination to preserve national ethnic character and cultural identity. Economic independence and opportunity was a further important issue that drove nationalist thinking.



THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIAL NATIONALISM

The contribution of nationalism towards decolonisation was not simply a post-1945 phenomenon. Nationalism was a long-term process, which had its origins rooted well before 1945. The historiography of the origins of nationalism suggests a varied range of priorities that led to the decolonisation of post-1945. The historiography attempts to establish an analysis of the interaction between the imperial ruler, Britain, and the ruled, the colonial subjects. One predominant theme is that of the long term continuity of anti-colonial resistance and opposition dating back to the early points in colonial rule. Such an approach has been developed by A. Boahen in his work *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (1989). A similar analysis was used by T. Ranger in *African Reactions to the Imposition of colonial rule in East and Central Africa* (1969). These views are based on an internationalist analysis that suggest a long term and planned resistance to colonial rule by indigenous populations.

A more structuralist analysis has been presented by R. Robinson in his work *Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration* (1972). In this, Robinson argues that British colonial power rested on collaboration with indigenous elites. By the middle of the twentieth century, this pool of collaborative elites had declined to a point where colonial rule came to its inevitable conclusion. In effect, colonial rule was no longer viable because native collaboration had evaporated.

This dependency theory is also promoted by J. Gallagher through his work *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire* (1982). An elaboration of the structuralist approach is presented by D. Low

in his work *Eclipse of Empire* (1991). In this, the analysis does not turn on the importance of collaborators and the subsequent decline but on the idea that British power was founded upon its willingness to appease the rich peasants through the economic advantage they perceived in imperialism. While imperialism held positive economic outcomes for this group, it could survive. Low argues that Britain increasingly moved away from this priority and consequently lost control of its colonies.

Nationalism may be seen as an inevitable outcome of the changes that colonialism brought to the societies it sought to control. For example, in Africa, British colonies experienced a process of rapid urbanisation. New economic practices were rapidly introduced, particularly in agriculture. The outcome was the resurgence of a demand to protect ethnic and cultural identity. In Africa, this became a central factor amongst nationalist leaders. Colonialism also brought with it educational opportunities through the Christian missions, for example. This, combined with the economic developments, enabled a small but articulate middle class to emerge and thus formed the foundation of much anti-colonialism.

By the late 1930s, many young Africans were going abroad for a European-style education. This was perceived as crucial to establishing freedom. Many, such as Jomo Kenyatta, went to the London School of Economics where Harold Laski taught left-wing political science and where they were able to meet anti-empire politicians within the British Labour Party. The basic problem for pre-war nationalist figures in Africa, and indeed in South East Asia, was that many of the ideas were experienced only by the urban elites and did not often penetrate into the rural hinterlands. A further problem for African nationalism lay in the deep divisions that often existed between competing groups. This is particularly well illustrated in Kenya. Anti-colonial options ranged from protecting cultural, ethnic and tribal identity to achieving territorial independence through to full blown Pan-Africanism.

Nationalism was a particularly difficult process to develop in countries that had a significant range of ethnic and cultural differences. In India, there was a major religious division between Hindus and Muslims. This was compounded even further by regionalism. Between the wars, nationalist fervour in India had been predominantly Hindu inspired. Gandhi's personal charisma placed him at the head of Indian nationalism and the Congress Party. The origins of the Congress Party dated back to 1885. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Congress Party was beginning to adopt a more proactive approach towards independence. India was a classic example of nationalist agitation after the First World War, during the 1930s, and during the Second World War, being effective in influencing British imperial thinking but also illustrating the vast divisions between nationalist groups. For the Muslims, an independent India meant a Hindu ruled India and this they could not accept.

Religious-based inter-communal conflict seriously undermined nationalist strength in India before the Second World War. These religious divisions were added to the regionalism that characterised the Indian sub-continent. As E McDonough comments in *The British Empire, 1815—1914* (1994), 'These deep regional differences in Indian society would have to be if nationalism was to stand any chance of winning widespread support.' For Britain, India was the 'jewel in the crown' and there was no commitment towards offering independence, certainly not before the Second World War. The barriers impeding the growth of Indian nationalism were significantly greater than the benefits of nationalism. There was no doubt that nationalism in India was divided, but this did not necessarily

mean that it was weakened. In 1935, Muhammed Ali Jinnah revitalised the Muslim League group by ruthlessly exploiting Muslim fears of Hindus in order to unite Muslims into a cohesive force.

The primary issue for Indian nationalists before 1945 was not whether independence would happen but what form it would take. The development of nationalist opposition to Britain was uneven across the empire.

THE SECOND BOER WAR, 1899—1902

The first significant expression of anti-British nationalism came at the very end of the nineteenth century in the form of the Boer War. Essentially, the war was the outcome of aggressive British imperialism in South Africa and Britain's 'victory' proved that such an attitude would not work. Britain won the military campaigns but it failed to establish any lasting legitimacy for militarism as a means of controlling imperial possessions. The war made a major contribution to the transformation of British attitudes towards empire and to the rejection of Chamberlain's vision of imperialism. It also reinforced the perception that Britain's ability to maintain an empire by force was simply not certain. The issue of 'national efficiency' that followed the war was most obviously displayed through the liberal reforms from 1906. Another outcome was the realisation by Britain that nationalists could, and would, make very effective attempts to defend their status and ethnic identity. In their work *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (1961), R. Robinson and J. Gallagher argue that the war was a response to Afrikaner nationalism and the threat it posed to British interests in South Africa. Britain's support for the uitlanders was part of a strategy to counter balance the power of the Boers and create the 'collaborator' population that was so central to preserving British imperial influence.

Britain had to confront Boer nationalism in order to maintain the framework of control upon which the empire was founded. Victory in the war was taken as evidence that the strategy of developing and protecting a collaborator population was the correct strategy to preserve the empire as cheaply and as efficiently as possible.

In his work *The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1895—9* (1980), A.N. Porter argues that the war was an act of aggressive imperialism in which the interests of the uitlanders were merely used as a pretext to gain popular support for the war in Britain. Chamberlain summed up the real British motive when he commented in the House of Commons, 'What is now at stake is the position of Great Britain in South Africa — and with it the estimate formed of our power and influence in our colonies and throughout the world.' What Chamberlain was attempting to establish was the centrality of South Africa to Britain's imperial image. Britain could not allow a fledgling nation of Dutch expatriots to establish its influence in an area Britain regarded as its power base. The irony of the Boer War was that the Boers received Home Rule in 1906 and the Union of South Africa was recognised in 1910. Nationalism had not been defeated and this was to prove to be a significant reality for other embryonic nationalist groups in other parts of the British Empire.

INDIAN NATIONALISM

In 1935, Britain had already conceded that India would eventually attain Dominion status. By 1937, the prominent nationalist party, the Indian National Congress, held a majority in the Indian provinces. On 6 July 1942, Gandhi announced the 'Quit India' campaign and called upon the British to 'purify themselves by surrendering power in India'. He told the All-India Congress Committee, 'We shall either free India or die in the attempt.' A period of intense violence followed and there were mass arrests of All-India nationalists, which effectively removed Congress as a nationalist force at that point in time. The campaign had shown that mass opposition could make India almost ungovernable. This was a particularly damaging reality when Britain was facing an increasingly serious threat in the Far East from Japanese military advances towards India. The fall of Malaya reinforced what was becoming a reality, that the British were in no position to prevent Indian independence.

The great irony in India was not that nationalism was ineffective in bringing about independence but that the conflicting national groups delayed independence. Attlee's post-war Labour government wanted a united India based upon a federal structure. This was the best way to ensure Britain's access to strategic military bases and airfields would be secured. Stafford Cripps' 1946 proposal for an Indian federation that would have responsibility for foreign policy, defence, communications and finance was rejected by the Muslim League because of its fears of a Congress-dominated centre. Serious rioting followed and the League was uncompromising in its determination to establish a separate and independent state of Pakistan. Britain decided to withdraw from India regardless of any agreement between Congress and the League.

By 1947, British rule in India had collapsed. The primary issue was not about the attainment of independence: it was about the nature of the structure of an independent Indian sub-continent. The initiatives lay with the nationalists, as Wavell commented in December 1946, 'We have lost nearly all power to control events.' It was not the Second World War that acted as the decisive turning point in the achievement of independence.

That was already an unofficial reality before the war started. The First World War was a significant turning point in that it strengthened the determination of Indian nationalists to press Britain for independence at a time of economic crisis in Britain in the interwar years. The key players in Indian nationalism, Gandhi and Jinnah, had displayed an irresistible determination. Indian nationalism was a truly mass movement and one was driven by religious and ethnic commitment. Had Britain decided that India was an asset, it is highly unlikely that it could have resisted the tremendous force of nationalism there. The Indian experience was one in which nationalism really did override all other factors that contributed in other parts of the British Empire to the granting of independence.

AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Kenya

In *Decolonisation and independence in Kenya, 1940—93* (1995), W. Maloba comments:

A successful national liberation movement thrives on massive national political mobilisation, on adopting a realistic revolutionary theory, but above all on having an ideology of liberation which aims to give its supporters peace, development, dignity and independence. The vision of successful liberation movements in Africa has been egalitarian, non-racist and vehemently opposed to exploitation.

The Mau Mau

In 1952, the self-styled Kenyan liberation movement, the Mau Mau, began its rebellion against colonial rule. Its membership was almost exclusively from the Kikuyu tribe and consisted largely of disaffected groups who rejected the economic constraints of colonial rule. After the Second World War, changes in agricultural methods were imposed by Mau Mau methods were based on subversion and terror, forms of nationalist action which were certainly not unfamiliar to the British. The questions that need to be considered at this point are can the Mau Mau be seen as a truly nationalist movement and to what extent did its existence contribute to Kenyan independence? The Mau Mau never galvanised popular mass nationalism against British colonial rule. In many respects, Mau Mau actions simply created a civil war in Kenya. Not only did the Mau Mau fight the colonial state, it also fought other Kenyans, particularly the loyalist Agikuyu people. The Mau Mau was never truly representative of the Kenyan people but it was broadly representative of the Kikuyu tribe. A further indicator of the Mau Mau's lack of nationalist credentials lies in the view that political independence, a primary objective of all nationalist movements, was directly linked to cultural freedom and a reassertion of national cultural identity. As H.S. Wilson comments in *African Decolonisation* (1994), 'The politics of nationalism, infused with traditional symbolism and idiom, fiercely defended indigenous society against alien encroachment.' Essentially, Mau Mau nationalism was an expression of Kikuyu economic, political and cultural interests. Although viewed as narrow, Mau Mau nationalism did act as an important catalyst in Kenya's struggle for independence.

The drive towards independence

Mau Mau terrorism exacted an economic cost to Britain. The state of emergency declared in 1952 forced Britain to increase its military commitment in Kenya. More significantly, Britain faced a political price because of Mau Mau tactics. The military occupation of Kenya could not last indefinitely. Equally, Kenya could not return to the pre-emergency position. Some element of reform became essential because of Mau Mau actions. The causal link between reform and the Mau Mau lay in the realisation by the colonial regime that it had to widen the scale of collaboration amongst Kenyans in order to marginalize the Mau Mau and prevent them from being seen as freedom fighters. At this stage, Britain had no specific plan to consider independence for Kenya in the short term.

Britain in its quest for colonial economic development. There were mass expulsions of Kikuyu squatters in the Rift Valley estates and the recruitment of non-Kikuyu labour by white farmers. These rural issues were exacerbated by urban unemployment and housing shortages. Kikuyu who had rejected rural poverty found themselves trapped in urban poverty. In post-war Kenya, the Mau Mau attracted many young Kikuyu whose economic opportunities had been undermined by colonialism. As David Birmingham writes in *Decolonisation in Africa* (1995), 'The roots of the Kenyan revolution. . . have to be sought in frustrated success rather than in persistent poverty.'

In effect, black Africans had to be offered increased political and economic opportunities within colonial society to enable Britain to retain Kenya as a colony. Once the process was underway, this objective would change.

The first truly significant step in that direction came in 1954 with the Lyttleton Constitution. This created a new structure for central government based on the principle of multiracial representation and a ministerial system that included both African and Asian ministers. Britain's strategy was to integrate the Kenyan 'middle classes' into the colonial order and thus hold shared interests under British control. The actual effect was to show Kenyan nationalists that the status quo was changing and progress towards independence could be realistically made. Each constitutional restructuring that the colonial authorities presented was rejected, as was the Lyttleton Constitution.

Political pressure for decolonisation

Even as late as 1959, the Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, stated that Kenya would achieve independence no earlier than 1975. By February 1960, Macmillan announced what appeared to be a complete U-turn in British imperial policy in Africa. The question is to what extent did non-Mau Mau nationalist-based political pressure influence Britain's actions in Kenya from 1960? In June 1955, political parties were allowed to function at district level but national consciousness was underdeveloped and most Kenyans lacked any experience in party organisation. This allowed a nationalist political elite to develop. Elections held in 1957 under the Lyttleton Constitution projected a new generation of African nationalist politicians to the forefront of Kenyan nationalism. Amongst them were

Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga and Daniel arap Moi. Mboya was an articulate trade unionist who had written *The Kenya Question — An African Answer* (1956). His election slogan was, 'To hell with European domination'. This group and others, immediately formed the African Elected Members Organisation (AEMO) and rejected the constitution. The nationalists undoubtedly held the initiative after the Hola Camp massacre in March 1959. The new Colonial Secretary, Ian Macleod, admitted that 'Hola helped to convince me that swift change was needed in Kenya'. The imperial government had no coordinated policies in place to respond to nationalist pressure. The problem for the nationalists was that they were not united. In 1959, the Kenya National Party (KNP) was formed, quickly followed by the Kenya Independence Movement (KIM). This, Britain accepted the principle of African majority rule in Kenya at the first Lancaster House Conference in January 1960. After this first conference, the two main nationalist parties were formed. These were the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU was the more radical of the two and in August 1961 Kenyatta became its first official leader upon his release from detention. From this point, the road to independence was mapped out. Political nationalism exploited the fractures that the Mau Mau had created in colonial rule in Kenya. Without the Mau Mau, independence may well have taken much longer to achieve, but in itself it was necessary but not

KEY EVENT

The Hola Camp Massacre 1959 Hola was a detention camp used to hold Mau Mau terrorist suspects. On March 3, 1959 a group of detainees were ordered to carry out digging work. They refused the grounds that they were political prisoners. The British guards reacted with extreme violence against the prisoners and this resulted in 11 deaths. The incident led to a huge amount of political opposition to the government in Britain.

sufficient to ensure independence. That came through the political determination of men such as Odinga and Mboya. On 12 December 1963, the Union jack was brought down as Kenya's national black, red, green and white flag was hoisted.

Uganda

Tribal differences, which were expressed through social class conflict and ethnic cultural divisions, impeded any sense of national unity in Uganda. Initially, the voice of Ugandan nationalism was largely stifled by these divisions. However, the rationale underlying the nationalist response to colonial rule in Uganda was not dissimilar from that applied in other African states. After the Second World War, the price of Ugandan cotton fell and the country experienced rising inflation in consumer goods. National awareness developed rapidly in the certainty that Britain was undermining Ugandan Africans' economic opportunities. Basically, the relationship with Britain was perceived as being economically damaging rather than economically advantageous to Africans.

Mutesa

The most powerful tribal group in Uganda were the Buganda, led after the war by their young king, Mutesa. The focus of Buganda-inspired nationalism was upon preventing themselves from being merged into a large unitary Ugandan state. The Buganda wanted a federal Uganda in order to protect their own interests. Mutesa was not campaigning for a unitary and independent Ugandan state but British actions served to heighten his nationalist credentials. Mutesa was a tribal aristocrat who represented only one ethnic section within Uganda. He was seen by many Ugandans as an indirect agent of colonial rule. His identity with the rest of African Ugandan society was tenuous and as such his ability to act as a national leader was meagre. By placing Mutesa under arrest and forcing him into exile in Britain in 1953, the colonial authorities transformed Mutesa into a Ugandan nationalist leader.

Other groups

The Roman Catholic Church formed the focal point around which many nationalist groups gravitated. The Church had traditionally opposed colonialism and its network of missions offered an excellent base from which to spread the nationalist message across the whole country. The northern region of Uganda also had its nationalist politicians who formed a 'people's congress', which aimed to establish a united Ugandan nation. It was through this diverse coalition of nationalist groups that Milton Obote became the first Prime Minister of an independent Uganda in 1962. Once again, a groundswell of popular nationalism had succeeded in winning independence. In spite of Mutesa's nationalist political discourse, Uganda was non-elitist and the nationalist message was able to reach a very large proportion of 'ordinary' Ugandans. In Uganda, the task of achieving independence was made easier through the absence of a large white settler population whose interests would have had to be considered by the colonial authorities.

Tanganyika

This was a large state with a relatively small population. The key to the development of nationalism lay in the fact that, unlike in many other African tribal states, there was a common language spoken. This was Swahili and it formed the basis of the spread of national consciousness.

Nationalist leaders could readily access the ordinary people regardless of their tribal differences. A common language meant that communications were more open and geographically scattered. The vast majority of Tanganyikans could participate in the nationalist debate and were therefore more inclined to adopt an activist stance. Tanganyika's nationalist leader, Julius Nyerere, was typical of the educated African nationalists who had absorbed democratic socialist thinking in Britain during the 1930s and transmitted this to his own country. This style of political communication appealed to the Tanganyikan masses.

The Central African Federation

In 1953, Britain created a new federal organisation in Africa consisting of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In part, this was done to prevent Southern Rhodesia being drawn into the orbit of South Africa where Afrikaner nationalists had taken power in 1948. White nationalism was a powerful force in South Africa. There were 300,000 whites in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and more arrived after 1945. This white nationalism was encouraged by the growth of black nationalism elsewhere in Africa. Nyasaland was made up almost entirely of native black Africans. Macmillan later commented:

Had any of us realised the most revolutionary way in which the situation would develop, and the rapid growth of African nationalism throughout the whole African continent, I think I should have opposed the putting together of three countries so opposite in their character and so different in their history.

Nyasaland

In 1959, revolt erupted in Nyasaland, led by Hastings Banda. The primary motivating factor that drove Banda was the conviction that without independence Nyasaland's people would be forever subordinate to the rule of white Rhodesians within the federation. Banda's leadership was the catalyst that produced independence. He said, 'Moderates have never achieved anything. It took extremists like Oliver Cromwell and Mrs Pankhurst to get things done.' Banda's party created a state within a state in Nyasaland as the nationalists simply boycotted the capital and refused to cooperate with government officials. Over the next four years, power was transferred to the nationalists and in 1964 the independent state of Malawi was created. Nationalism had been very effective but the primary reason for its success lay in the recognition by Britain that Nyasaland had no significance in terms of British interests in South Africa. Economically, it was of little value compared to the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia and the tobacco and maize plantations of the South.

Northern Rhodesia

In Northern Rhodesia, the nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda was as determined in his extremism as Banda. Kaunda threatened to make the Mau Mau campaigns look like a 'child's picnic'. Again, although nationalism did have a significant impact on Britain's decision to decolonise in Northern

Rhodesia, there were powerful economic factors that supported nationalism. Britain feared the loss of cheap Rhodesian copper but was convinced that the favourable terms of trade would be unaffected by independence. The new state of Zambia would remain economically dependent upon the sale of copper to Britain. In effect, little of real significance changed for Britain. Black majority rule had no major impact on what really mattered to Britain, therefore Britain could afford to comply with African nationalism and avoid unnecessary conflict. The economic context and the inevitable collapse of the federation made it almost impossible for nationalism not to succeed in Northern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia

White nationalism was the power source in Southern Rhodesia. Faced with Britain's determination not to offend the Afro—Asian Commonwealth by supporting what was perceived as white supremacy in Southern Rhodesia, the Prime Minister, Ian Smith, made a Unilateral Declaration in Independence (UDI) in November 1965.

Rhodesian Africans made it clear that they would not accept independence without black majority rule. Black nationalism fought in exile. Zanu, led by Joshua Nkomo, was based in Zambia, while its rival, Zanu, led by Robert Mugabe, operated from Mozambique. Mugabe was determined not to simply inherit an intact colonial structure. He wanted to establish a new egalitarian society. South Africa feared that an armed struggle between these two groups might spill over into its apartheid system and so became increasingly concerned that a peaceful resolution bereached sooner rather than later. Ian Smith was also convinced that the war had to be resolved. In 1980, Mugabe was appointed the Prime Minister of an independent Zimbabwe.

Aggressive nationalism had been successful. Mozambique had played a key role but the negative perceptions of white supremacy, which was increasingly being rejected internationally, was also a factor. The apartheid system in South Africa was no longer acceptable and due to lack of international support Rhodesia's determination to prevent majority rule could not succeed.

NATIONALISM IN THE FAR EAST

Malaya

By January 1942, the Japanese army was advancing almost unopposed down the Malayan Peninsular. On 15 February 1942, about 70,000 imperial troops surrendered the 'Gibraltar of the East', Singapore, to the after a mere fifteen days of resistance. The territorial and military losses, serious though they were, paled into insignificance compared to the impact the defeat was to have upon the perception of British imperial rule, not just in Malaya but also throughout the British Empire. The British had cultivated an ethos of superiority that was instantly shattered by the Japanese occupation. There is no doubt that Britain's defeat at the hands of an Asiatic state, Japan, significantly undermined Britain's image as an invincible western imperial power. The defeat also heightened the realisation that Britain no longer had the military capacity to maintain such far flung imperial outposts. Malaya proved that geographically Britain's empire was too scattered to defend effectively. To add to this, the Japanese occupiers of Malaya and Burma encouraged the development of nationalist groups by establishing puppet regimes.

The immediate post-war situation in Malaya was similar to that in Africa. An economic crisis based on inflation, food shortages and unemployment dogged British attempts to restore imperial credibility in Malaya. The Malayan population consisted not only of indigenous peoples but a significant proportion of ethnic Chinese and Indians who had emigrated to Malaya for economic reasons during the nineteenth century. In 1948, the Malayan Communist Party organised strikes amongst the groups who worked on the rubber plantations and in the tin mines. N. White offers a useful comment on this in his work *Decolonisation: The British Experience Since 1945* (1999) when he notes, 'To present the communist revolt as a nationalist uprising is problematic since the MCP was largely a Chinese chauvinist organisation and did not appeal to the Malays.'

What stimulated nationalist fervour in Malaya more than anything was the application of a multi-racialist policy adopted by Britain. A similar approach had been tried in East Africa during the 1950s. Britain proposed a Malaya Union that threatened to jeopardise Malay political supremacy. Malay nationalism was perhaps more complex than any other within the British Empire. In his work *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya* (1994), A. Milner suggests that 'even in the last years of the British presence, the character and value of (Malay) nationalism continued to be a matter of debate'. Malay nationalism became a complex compromise between the Malay race, Malay Chinese, Malay Indians and the Sultanate. Although a contributory factor, nationalism in Malaya played a far less significant role in the achievement of independence than did nationalism in other parts of the British Empire, particularly in India and Africa. Malay nationalism was too diverse and too sectional to have a major impact. Although there was terrorism, its impact was significantly less influential in contributing towards independence than the Mau Mau was in Kenya, for example.

CONCLUSIONS

All European imperial powers were confronted with nationalist movements and the British experience was no exception to this. Nationalism was a means of political expression that was available to largely disenfranchised indigenous peoples. It was often the product of rising populations faced with diminishing resources, agricultural depression and economic deprivation. Many colonial peoples would have remained content with their colonial lot if conditions had improved for them. Nationalism may well have remained a fringe concept that inspired only a small number of articulate middle class activists.

The post-war order that Britain entered revealed the growing international and economic irrelevancy of maintaining a massive global empire. A new, more rational and pragmatic relationship had to be established and it was this fracture in imperial normality that nationalism was able to exploit to great effect. The post-war context offered an ideal environment for nationalism in all its forms to be used positively.

At times, nationalism was divisive. It expressed itself through terror and, although this did have an impact, it often delayed the moves towards independence. However, the reality for most forms of nationalism was that there had to be a degree of determination that could only be effectively expressed through violence.